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THE ASSURANCE OF FAITH
Nicholas Wolterstorff

In this paper I discuss an issue concerning how faith ought to be held.
Traditionally there have been those who contended that faith should be held
with full certainty, with great firmness. John Calvin is an example. John
Locke offered both epistemological and pragmatic considerations in favor of
the view that faith should be held with distinctly less than maximal firmness.
He proposed a Principle of Proportionality. I assess the tenability of Locke's
proposal-while also suggesting that Calvin's position is different from what
on first reading it would appear to be. It is not straightforwardly in conflict
with Locke's position.

The Hebrew and Christian scriptures praise and enjoin what they (in English
translations) call faith. That has led persons in the communities which take
these scriptures as authoritative to call and struggle for faith. It has led
theologians and philosophers to inquire into the nature of faith, and to offer
suggestions as to how faith ought to be held, or can best be held.
Proposals as to the nature of faith, and suggestions as to the proper or best
manner of holding it, have focussed for the most part on four issues:
(1) Of what genus is faith a species? Is it a species of believing propositions
on sayso? Is it a species of loyalty to some person or cause? Is it a species
of trusting someone? Is it a species of believing what someone has promised?
Is it a species of 'concern'? Is it a species of knowledge? if so, of what sort:
agnitio (recognition, acknowledgement), cognitio, or what?
(2) What is the intentional content of faith? Iffaith is believing propositions
on sayso, whose sayso and which propositions? If faith is a species of loyalty,
loyalty to whom and concerning what? And so forth.
(3) What, if anything, entitles a person to have faith? Why is faith not
unwise, or irresponsible? Or is it one or the other of these?
(4) What is the proper way of holding faith? If faith is 'concern,' must it
be 'ultimate' to be faith? Or should it be 'ultimate' even if it can be faith
without being 'ultimate'? If faith is trust, ought it to be unquestioning and
unwavering; or would it be better if it were? And so forth.
The question I wish to discuss falls under this fourth heading. There are
those who have argued-I have John Locke and his associates especially in
mind-that Christians ought to hold their faith with a firmness distinctly less
than that, say, with which most of us assent to the proposition that 2x3=6.
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Others have apparently denied this. Of these, some have apparently not just
rejected Locke's normative suggestion but suggested an alternative; viz., that
faith ought to be held with maximal firmness. It is this dispute which I wish
to enter. I shall do so by bringing part of the philosophical tradition, in the
person of John Locke, into dialogue with part of the theological tradition, in
the person of John Calvin. I choose Locke because I know of no one who
has more articulately presented the case for tempered firmness than he did;
I choose Calvin because I know of no theologian who has discussed the issue
with more theological acumen and human sensitivity.
I

The question, "What is the nature of (Christian) faith?" is, in my judgment,
ill-formed. Both in the Scriptures and in the Christian tradition this single
word "faith" is used to pick out a number of somewhat different phenomena.
Each of those has its own 'nature.' There is no 'nature' of all together. If the
discussion which follows is not to be "void for vagueness" we shall have to
make a selection.
How shall we do that? I suggest that there is no better way of doing it than
to be guided by that passage of Scripture which treats of faith at greatest
length and most directly; viz., the well-known eleventh chapter of Hebrews.
The writer opens the chapter with a crisp definition of faith and then proceeds
to offer a series of brief narratives concerning heroes of faith, these narratives
interspersed with amplifications on the opening definition. In the following
two chapters he goes on to discuss the sorts of actions which faith calls forth,
how one is to understand and endure the sufferings which faith so regularly
causes, and the role of Jesus in faith. Allowing this classical discussion of
faith to guide us in our choice will save us from idiosyncrasy; an additional
advantage, as it turns out, is that the phenomenon which the writer of Hebrews
calls faith is also that on which Calvin had his eye when he discussed faith.
Faith, says the writer, is the hypostasis of things hoped for, the elenchos
of things not seen. In older translations, hypostasis and elenchos were translated, literally and straightforwardly, as "substance" and "evidence" respectively. In the newer RSV the translation runs, "the assurance of things hoped
for, the conviction of things not seen." It must be granted that "hypostasis"
and "elenchos" are used eccentrically here; "assurance" and "conviction,"
however, seem less than satisfactory translations. But since nothing in my
discussion will hang on what precisely is meant by "hypostasis" and "elenchos" here, and since I have no better suggestion of my own to make, I will
adopt the RSV translation.
Having given his definition of "faith," to which he adds immediately that
"by it the men [and women] of old received divine approval," the writer of
Hebrews proceeds to cite examples. His first example falls under the heading
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of conviction of things not seen but not under that of assurance of things
hoped for: "By faith we understand that the world was created by the word
of God, so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear."
All the examples which follow, however, are examples of both. I think we
must conclude that paradigmatic examples of faith are specimens not only of
conviction of things not seen but of assurance of things hoped for.
Paradigmatic examples of faith are thus oriented not toward eternity but
toward what happens. More specifically, they are oriented toward the future.
More specifically yet, they are the conviction that something good will come
about, not something bad. Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, not of
things indifferent, let alone of things dreaded. The conviction of Californians
that a serious earthquake will occur there sometime in the near future is not
an example of faith. Faith has to do with the conviction that history has a
certain pattern, a certain 'grain; to it. It has to do with the conviction that
what happens will overall prove good for one, and for others as well.
Is Christian (and Jewish) faith then simply optimism? Suppose that because
of one's supposed discovery of certain laws of nature and society one is
optimistic about one's own destiny and that of human beings in general.
Would that be faith? Was Karl Marx a man of faith? No. As the writer
proceeds, he begins to speak repeatedly of promises, of God's promises. "By
faith [Abraham] sojourned in the land of promise." "By faith Sarah herself
received power to conceive, even when she was past the age, since she
considered him faithful who had promised." "By faith, Abraham, when he
was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises was ready
to offer up his own son." "These all died in faith, not having received what
was promised ...... "And all these, though well attested by their faith, did not
receive what was promised ......
In faith, that which one hopes for is that which God promised. One hopes
for it because one trusts God's promises. Indeed, one couldn't trust God's
promise without hoping for what is promised. We can say, I think, that as the
writer of Hebrews understands it, Christian faith, in its paradigmatic form, is
a species of believing or trusting someone's promises, specifically, God's
promises. God's promises to bless, to save.
"Aren't you leaping to unwarranted conclusions?" someone might object.
Granted that trusting God's promises is central in the discussion of faith
offered by the writer of Hebrews. How do you know that the writer would
not, if the question were put to him, insist that faith is actually the more
general phenomenon of trusting God? Trusting God's promises-i.e., trusting
God with respect to God's promises-is indeed faith. But so too is trusting
God with respect to God's warnings. And trusting God with respect to what
God reveals about himself. This last comes close to the traditional medieval
concept of faith, according to which faith was understood as the appropriate
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human counterpart to God's revelation: Faith is believing propositions on
God's sayso. Perhaps both that, and what Hebrews focuses on, should be
thought of as special types of the more general phenomenon of trusting God,
this more general phenomenon being faith.
Perhaps so. All the main points to be made in what follows could be made
in terms of that more general concept. I shall, however, follow the emphasis
of the writer of Hebrews in the examples he gives of faith, if not indeed in
his very understanding of faith, by taking faith to be trusting God's promises
to bless and save. I do so in part to counteract what seems to me the persistent
tendency in the Christian tradition to allow this phenomenon of trusting God's
promises to recede from attention in discussions on faith, replaced by almost
exclusive attention on trusting God with respect to what God says about
himself. When that happens, the 'heroism' of the heroes of faith is no longer
understood. Faith is a little child putting its hand in the hand of the parent,
trusting the parent's promise.
Faith, understood as trusting God's promises to bless, presupposes believing that God has promised to bless and believing that God has (or will at the
appropriate time have) the power and the will to carry out what God has
promised. (Perhaps the reason the writer of Hebrews cites, as his first example
of faith, belief in creation by the word of God, is that he wishes to remind
the reader of God's power.) Thus for the secularist, and for the adherents of
many religions other than Judaism and Christianity, faith is not even an
option. Faith is not some universally human phenomenon. It cannot occur
outside a certain framework of conviction. And for most human beings, that
framework of conviction is absent. Naturally there can and will be other
things in their lives which would, in English, be called "faith."
May it be that trusting God's promises to bless just is believing the propositions that God has promised to bless, and that God has (or will have) the
power and will to implement the promise? I think not. One might believe that
someone has promised to do something, and that the person has (or will have)
the power and will to do what he promised, without in any way placing one's
confidence in those promises. They might be, or be treated as, irrelevant to
oneself. Trusting God's promises includes such placing of confidence. It is
my impression that there is no set of propositions such that trusting God's
promise is identical with believing those propositions. But we must move on;
it would distract us from our main purpose to probe further into the nature
of the general phenomenon of trusting someone's promise to do X, or even
into the specific phenomenon of trusting God's promise to bring about shalom, well-being, flourishing. l
John Calvin, in his discussion of faith, insisted repeatedly that Christian
faith is the conviction that God is good to one based on one's trust in God's
promise to one. Now though one could in principle believe that God is good
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to one without basing that conviction on one's acceptance of God's promises,
one could scarcely trust God's promise to bring one some good without being
convinced that God is good to one (in at least that respect). Accordingly, I
think we will be entirely faithful to Calvin's thought if we describe him as
holding that Christian faith (in its paradigmatic form) is trusting the promises
of God toward one. Let me quote some of the relevant passages: "In understanding faith it is not merely a question of knowing that God exists, but
also-and this especially-of knowing what is his will toward us" [Institutes
III, ii, 6].2 This we discern by listening to God's Word. Thus there "is a
permanent relationship between faith and the Word" [ibid.]. Faith is "a knowledge of God's will toward us, perceived from his Word" [ibid.]'
But since man's heart is not aroused to faith at every word of God, we must
find out ... what, strictly speaking, faith looks to in the Word. God's word to
Adam was, 'You shall surely die.' God's word to Cain was, 'The blood of
your brother cries out to me from the earth'. But these words are so far from
being capable of establishing faith that they can of themselves do nothing
but shake it .... Where our conscience sees only indignation and vengeance,
how can it fail to tremble and to be afraid? or to shun the God whom it dreads?
Yet faith ought to seek God, not to shun him.
It is plain, then, that we do not yet have a full definition of faith, inasmuch
as merely to know something of God's will is not to be accounted faith. But
what if we were to substitute his benevolence or his mercy in place of his
will ... ? Thus, surely, we shall more closely approach the nature of faith; for
it is after we have learned that our salvation rests with God that we are
attracted to seek him .... we need the promise of grace, which can testify to
us that the Father is merciful... [III, ii, 7]. [So] we shall possess a right
definition of faith if we call it a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in
Christ. .. [ibid.].
[We] make the freely given promise of God the foundation of faith because
upon it faith properly rests. Faith is certain that God is true in all things
whether he command or forbid, whether he promise or threaten; and it also
obediently receives his commandments, observes his prohibitions, heeds his
threats. Nevertheless, faith properly begins with the promise, rests in it, and
ends in it. For in God faith seeks life ... [III, ii, 29].

John Locke's account of faith was different, more traditional. Faith, says
Locke, is believing what God has revealed, provided one believes it on the
ground that it has been revealed by God and provided one believes that, in
turn, on the credit of someone who claims that it was revealed to him (or
someone else) by God. Faith is thus a unique species of believing something
on sayso, of believing something on authority. In Locke's own words, "Faith
is the assent to any proposition, not made out by the deductions of Reason;
but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraordinary way of communication" [Essay IV, xviii, 2].3
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Clearly what Locke singles out as faith is different from what Calvin and
the writer of Hebrews single out. Accordingly, when Calvin and Locke speak
about the manner in which a person should hold to faith, they are not speaking
about the same thing and disagreeing, or apparently disagreeing, only about
the proper manner of holding it. They are speaking about different things,
different ways of being. Locke is speaking about believing propositions, on
the credit of some proposer, as coming from God. Calvin is speaking about
trusting God's promises. Nonetheless there can be no doubt that what Locke
says about the way we should hold to faith, as he understands faith, he would
also say, mutatis mutandis, about holding to faith as Calvin understands it.
Perhaps Locke would adapt his thesis to Calvin's understanding of faith by
arguing that trusting some promise of God to do something presupposes
believing the proposition that God has promised that, and the proposition that
God has the power and retains the will to carry it out; and then contending
that one or both of those propositions ought to be believed with less than
maximal confidence.
II
Faith, Calvin insists, is "a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us" [III, ii, 7], "a sure persuasion" of it [III, ii, 12], "a sure
confidence in divine benevolence and salvation" [III, ii, 15]. Calvin explains
his insistence thus: "We add the words 'sure' and 'firm' in order to express
a more solid constancy of persuasion. For, as faith is not content with a
doubtful and changeable opinion, so is it not content with an obscure and
confused conception but requires full and fixed certainty, such as men are
wont to have from things experienced and proved" [III, ii, 15]. In short, "we
teach," says Calvin, "that faith ought to be certain and assured ... " [III, ii,
17].
One of Locke's reasons for arguing that faith ought to be held with less
than maximal firmness was consequentialist. He and his associates were
convinced that only if believers did not hold their faith with maximal firmness
was there any hope for toleration in a society characterized by religious
diversity. But that was not Locke's only reason; nor, it would appear, the one
to which he himself gave most weight. Locke's insistence that Christian
believers should not hold their faith with maximal firmness was a straightforward consequence of his general epistemology-coupled, of course, with
his understanding of faith. I wish, in some detail, to consider Locke's epistemological argument; that done, to look briefly at his appeal to social consequences.
The focus of Locke's concern in the latter part of Book IV of his Essay
was on what might be called regulative, as distinguished from analytic, epistemology. That is to say, Locke was concerned to offer, in Descartes' phrase,
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"rules for the direction of the mind," or in his own phrase, rules for "the
conduct of the understanding." Fundamental to Locke's regulative epistemology was the distinction between belief and firmness of belief. Locke thought
that one could hold the same belief with differing degrees of firmness-and
different beliefs with the same degree of firmness.
What did Locke have in mind by firmness of belief? In recent years there
has been much talk about levels of confidence in propositions-with betting
situations often proposed as tests of such. Might Locke, by "firmness of
belief," have meant levels of confidence?
I think not. In any case, one would hope not; for the two notions are distinct
in an important way. One cannot believe p with a certain firmness without
believing p; one can, though, have a certain level of confidence in p without
believing p. If one believes p very firmly one will not, except through inadvertence, believe not-p at all. One will, though, have a certain level of confidence in not-p-namely, a low level. So too, while fully aware of p, one
might believe neither p nor not-p; in that situation one will, though, have a
certain level of confidence in both. Thus the array of a person's degrees of
firmness of belief will not satisfy the Pascalian calculus of probabilities. It's
not true, in general, that the firmness with which one believes p varies inversely with the firmness with which one believes not-po Whether the phenomenon of levels of confidence satisfies or should satisfy the Pascalian
calculus remains, from what we have said, an open question.
It is worth remarking that having a certain level of confidence in p is also
not to be equated with being more or less certain of p, nor with finding p
more or less credible (belief-worthy). One might find both p and not-p low
in credibility, as one might be very uncertain of both of them. Thus it's not
the case that as the credibility or certainty of p goes up, that of not-p goes
down (and vice versa). The complementational principle for negation neither
holds nor could hold for either of these phenomena.
The thought naturally comes to mind that to believe p with such-and-such
firmness is just to have such-and-such a level of confidence in p and to
believe p. There is no evidence that Locke himself actually thought of firmness of belief like this; nonetheless, I judge that he would have been happy
to embrace this way of thinking if it had been put to him. I myself judge that
the notion of firmness of belief is ambiguous as between this notion, of
believing with a certain level of confidence, and another notion. Later, when
we return to Calvin I shall call attention to that other notion and thus disambiguate the notion of firmness of belief. In the meanwhile, let us construe
firmness along the line suggested.
Might it be a mistake, though, to think of believing a proposition as one
thing, and having a level of confidence in a proposition as another thing?
Might it be that believing p just is having a level of confidence in p above a
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certain threshold? Does our customary trichotomy of believing/withholding/disbelieving simply pick out broad gamuts on the continuum of levels of
confidence? Is talk about levels of confidence to be seen as the invitation to
pick out narrower gamuts-or even, points-on the same continuum?
I rather doubt it; since it appears to me that one might have the same level
of confidence in two different propositions while believing one and not believing the other. But I shall discuss the issues without presupposing an
answer. It's worth noting, however, that even if belief is identical with levels
of confidence above a certain threshold, a regulative epistemology of degrees
of confidence does not automatically constitute a regulative epistemology of
belief. For the regulative epistemology of degrees of confidence might tell
us only that degrees of confidence are to be matched with degrees of something else; and from that we might not be able to infer how much of this
something else, in absolute terms, is necessary for one to be entitled to a
degree of confidence which is a case of belief-even if we knew where the
line demarcating belief from non-belief fell.
Parenthetically, did Locke hold the assimilationist thesis, that believing p
consists of having a level of confidence in p above a certain threshold? I think
not. At least he speaks as if he did not. For example, he sometimes speaks as
if he believed that though belief just flows over us in certain situations, in
those same situations we can, presumably by act of will, regulate the firmness
of our belief-regulate the level of confidence in the proposition believed.
He says, for example, that "the grounds of probability, ... as they are the
foundations on which our assent is built; so are they also the measure whereby
its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated" [IV, xvi, 1]. But if Locke
held the assimilationist thesis, this would be a most surprising thing to say:
that one's ability to regulate the degree of confidence one has in some proposition has this limitation on it-one cannot regulate it across the belief
threshold, only within the space which lies on either side of the threshold. In
any case, the central regulative rule of Locke's epistemology is a rule for the
regulation of degrees of confidence and not a rule for the regulation of belief.
The rule is this: One ought never, for any proposition, to adopt a level of
confidence in it which is not proportioned to its probability on one's total
evidence for it.
Four comments must be made about this principle of proportionality, two
explanatory and two qualifying. First, there will, of course, be propositions
toward which one adopts no level of confidence whatsoever; in particular,
propositions of which one has never so much as thought. Of these, there may
be some toward which one ought to adopt some level of confidence. But if
so, the principle of proportionality has nothing to say about that.
Second, to understand Locke's intent we must take note of an ambiguity
in the notion of proportioning levels of confidence to probability on evidence.
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One might mean by this that if the probability of p on one's total evidence
is greater than the probability of q on one's total evidence, then one's level
of confidence in p is to be greater than one's level of confidence in q. Such
a principle would not tell one how much confidence to place in either p or
q. Of course, if the probability of 0 on total evidence is even higher than is
that of p, then, if the principle is to be satisfied, one's level of confidence in
p must not be maximal; similarly, if some proposition has even less going
for it than q does, then, if the principle is to be satisfied, one's level of
confidence in q must not be minimal. But I see no apriori reason for thinking
that, whatever be one's level of confidence in p, it might not have been
slightly higher or slightly lower while yet the totality of one's levels of
confidence satisfy the principle. The case will turn on whether there are no
no more discriminable degrees of probability on evidence than there are
discriminable levels of confidence. The other way of understanding the notion
of proportionality is this: One might assume that between levels of confidence
and certain degrees of probability on evidence there is an inherent aptness
(fittingness, rightness, propriety); and one might hold that one's task is to see
to it that one's level of confidence in some proposition fits its probability on
total evidence.
I know of no passage in which Locke distinguishes these interpretations
and chooses between them. Nonetheless a good deal of what he says suggests
quite clearly that it is the latter interpretation that he has in mind. Accordingly, that is how I shall interpret the principle. (Either way, the principle is
for the regulating of degrees of confidence and not for the regulating of
degrees of belief. It is totally silent on when it is permitted for one to believe
p; alternatively, it is totally silent on when the 'fit' degree of confidence is
above the belief threshold.)
And now for the qualifications. Locke was not of the view that we do hold,
nor of the view that we ought to hold, all our beliefs on evidence-i.e., on
the basis of other beliefs of ours. Some of our believings are immediate,
non-inferential. And to some of those we are entitled. But if I am entitled to
believe some proposition immediately, I am not obligated to proportion the
firmness of my belief to its probability on any evidence whatsoever. Thus
the principle is to be interpreted as having this prefatory qualification: With
the exception of those propositions which one is entitled to believe immediately ....
Secondly, suppose one's total evidence is very poor, but that the proposition in question is highly probable on that evidence. The principle as it stands
instructs one to believe the proposition with great firmness. But that seems
thoroughly implausible. Locke himself never discusses the matter. But it
seems obvious that we have to attach this qualification: provided one's total
evidence is satisfactory. One can think of one's total evidence for a proposi-
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tion as being satisfactory in case it entitles one to adopt a certain level of
confidence in it. Of course, even when one's evidence for p is extremely poor,
one might still be entitled to adopt some definite level of confidence in
p-namely, a level in the region of .5. But in such a case it's not the evidence
which confers the entitlement.
What level of confidence ought one to place in propositions for which one
does not have satisfactory evidence? Here various answers are possible. One
might say that the notion of a right or wrong level of confidence does not
apply in such cases. Or one might say, implausibly, that to all such propositions one ought to adopt the minimal level of confidence; or, almost as
implausibly, a .5 level of confidence. The most plausible answer would seem
to be that one is entitled to whatever level of confidence one happens to have
in the proposition.
Whatever one's answer, it would be plausible to suppose that in some cases
there is another and prior obligation-namely, the obligation to acquire satisfactory evidence. Locke himself was clearly of the view, however, that by
no means is there always such a prior obligation. Acquiring satisfactory
evidence typically takes time and energy; and sometimes spending the time
and energy would require one to neglect other, more weighty, obligations. It
may be added that responsibly assessing the probability of a proposition on
satisfactory evidence may also take time and energy which one ought to
devote to carrying out more weighty obligations. Thus the Principle of Proportionality should be seen as specifying a prima facie, not an ultima facie,
obligation.
The qualification just made obviously constitutes an escape hatch for the
religious believer: If one's total evidence for one's faith is not satisfactory,
then the Principle of Proportionality does not apply; or if it is satisfactory,
but responsible weighing of probability on that evidence would take one away
from more weighty obligations, then the application of the Principle to the
case is superseded. Locke was of the view, however, that religious convictions are so important that no obligations could be so weighty as to prohibit
one from taking the time, at least on "the sabbath," to acquire satisfactory
evidence and to responsibly weigh probability on that evidence. It is far from
obvious that this is true. Thus there may be a good many religious beliefs of
a good many people for which the principle's application is superseded or to
which it does not apply-even when its inapplicability does not represent a
violation of prior responsibility to acquire satisfactory evidence. But I shall
here not press the point.
To show that the Principle of Proportionality holds for faith, Locke must
also show that no one is entitled to hold faith immediately. To simplify my
exposition of this part of Locke's argument, let me now neglect the complications introduced by the fact that epistemic obligations do not always su-
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persede all other obligations. Locke was of the view that one is entitled to
accept some proposition immediately only if the acceptance accompanies, or
is evoked by, one's 'seeing' the proposition to be true or remembering that
one has done so. He was further of the view that 'seeing' or remembering
'seeing' some propositions to be true constitutes knowledge. Knowledge is
not a species of belief. Locke himself explains belief as taking some proposition to be true without 'seeing' or remembering 'seeing' it to be true. But
suppose we regiment our terminology a bit (more) and define "acceptance"
as taking some proposition to be true whether or not one 'sees' or remembers
'seeing' it to be true. Then believing, as Locke understands it, is a species of
acceptance; and Locke was of the view that if we 'see' or remember 'seeing'
some proposition to be true, we will also accept it. (The 'seeing' or remembering 'seeing' are not to be identified with the accepting.) Locke assumed
that the firmness of acceptance which accompanies 'seeing' or remembering
'seeing' cannot be, or need not be, regulated. At least he never speaks about
the need to regulate it. And he assumed that the level of confidence is always
so high that one is certain of the proposition. Furthermore, though he held
that we place a higher degree of confidence in some of the things of which
we are certain than in others, he held that the maximal degree of confidence
one can place in a proposition is that which we do place in those necessary
truths which are self-evident for us and in those contingent propositions
which are incorrigible reports of our own states of mind-and in the proposition that we ourselves exist.
Recall, then, that something is an item of faith, on Locke's view, if one
believes it on the ground that God has revealed it. Locke held that the hypothetical proposition, if God has revealed p then p is true, can be 'seen' to be
true. He also held, though, that for no proposition p can one just 'see' that
God has revealed p. And he held that in general (unless more weighty nonepistemic considerations intrude) the only way to secure entitlement to believing some proposition and adopting some definite degree of confidence in
it, apart from 'seeing' or remembering 'seeing' it to be true, is to believe it
on satisfactory evidence. Further, his classical foundational ism led him to
hold that a necessary condition of evidence being satisfactory is that it consist
of propositions that one 'sees' or remembers having 'seen' to be true. The
evidence in the case before us will have to be evidence concerning the credit
of the proposer. But that evidence will never entail that God has revealed p.
The proposition that God has revealed p will always have a probability of
less than 1.0 on satisfactory evidence. And from this Locke concluded that
p itself will have a probability of less than 1.0 on total evidence.
Locke is mistaken about central points in this argument. I take one of
Thomas Reid's signal contributions to western philosophy to have been his
calling to our attention that we are all entitled to a multiplicity of immediate
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beliefs which we do not 'see' or remember having 'seen' to be true: perceptual beliefs, believing what people tell us, etc. And I take the discussion of
recent years concerning "Reformed epistemology" to have shown that persons are also sometimes entitled to immediate beliefs about God which they
do not 'see' to be true. Perhaps, then, some of us are sometimes entitled to
believe immediately that God has revealed so-and-so. In short, it is vastly
more difficult to know when and where Locke's Principle of Proportionality
applies than he ever thought it was.
Fundamental though such issues are, however, I want on this occasion to
set them off to the side and, without presupposing any particular position on
what may be believed immediately and when and by whom, address Locke's
central claim, that unless one is entitled to believe p immediately, one ought
to proportion one's level of confidence in p to the probability of p on one's
total evidence, provided that evidence is satisfactory. We believe propositions
with more or less firmness, i.e., with higher or lower levels of confidence.
Locke was persuaded that this feature of our mental life ought to be regulated.
How? By reference, he said, to the probability of the proposition in question
on one's total relevant evidence, provided that is satisfactory. One's level of
confidence ought to fit the probability.
Is this rule of governance correct?4 We can begin by asking, Why did Locke
think it was correct? Locke's defense occurs in the following passage, a
passage in which he blends together a defense of the thesis that levels of
confidence ought to be governed, with a defense of his proposed rule for
governance, namely, his Principle of Proportionality:
There are very few lovers of truth for truths sake .... How a man may know
whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry: and I think there is this one
unerring mark of it, viz., the not entertaining any proposition with greater
assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond
this measure of assent, 'tis plain receives not truth in the love of it; loves not
truth for truths sake, but for some other bye end. For the evidence that any
proposition is true (except such as are self-evident), lying only in the proofs
a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees
of that evidence, 'tis plain all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some
other affection, and not to the love of truth: It being as impossible, that the
love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence, that there is to me,
that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition, for the sake of that evidence, which it has not, that it is true: which is
in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible or probable that it may
not be true [IV, xix, 1].

I fail to see any cogency in this argument. Locke seems to take it as obvious
that love of truth will lead one to try to bring it about that one's level of
confidence in a proposition fits the strength of the evidence for it. Accordingly, he remarks that any divergence from such fit must be due to a love of
something other than truth. But what is it that Locke is here taking love of
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truth to be? He doesn't say. The only attractive way I know of for thinking
of love of truth, and aversion to falsehood, is along the following lines: If
one loves truth and is averse to falsehood with equal intensity, and has no
other loves and aversions which inhibit or distort that love and aversion, then,
for any proposition which comes within one's ken, one will do what one can,
given one's other obligations, to bring it about that one believes it if and only
if it is true. If, per adventure, one should succeed in that endeavor, then one's
love of truth and aversion to falsehood would have been requited. But notice
that it would have been requited no matter how much or how little confidence
one places in what one believes. Thus, understanding love of truth along these
lines gives no support at all to Locke's principle.
But if one believes some proposition with a level of confidence higher than
what fits its probability on one's evidence, wouldn't that have the consequence that one would tend to disregard whatever negative evidence might
be forthcoming in the future? And that would certainly impair satisfying one's
love of truth, would it not? Why would it be thought that that is true? Probably
Bertrand Russell at one time believed very firmly that there is a set of all
sets. But that didn't impede him from treating the paradoxes he discovered
as strong evidence against the proposition.
Let us then turn our attention in the opposite direction: Is there anything
to be said against the Principle of Proportionality? Notice, in the first place,
that though a given proposition may be equally probable on two different
bodies of satisfactory evidence, one of those bodies of evidence may be
considerably better than the other. What should be thought of as the determinant of better here? Surely one candidate is reliability: One body of evidence for a proposition is better than anothe" ""dy of evidence for that
proposition in case it is a more reliable indicator of its truth or falsehood.
When reliability is thought of as determining the quality of evidence, then
satisfactory evidence, as we explained it, can be thought of as that sort of
evidence which is minimally reliable for conferring epistemic entitlement.
But whatever be settled on as the determinant of quality, surely if levels of
confidence are to be determined by evidence at all, they should be determined
by quality of evidence as well as probability on evidence. If two bodies of
evidence are both entirely in favor of All S is P-nothing negative turns up
in either-but the one is more reliable than the other, then surely the more
reliable entitles the person to a higher level of confidence. Or, to take one of
Hume's examples, if two bodies of evidence both point to the conclusion that,
on average, 19 out of every 20 ships which sail from this harbor return, but
the one body of evidence is considerably more ample than the other, then
surely it entitles one to a higher level of confidence in the proposition that,
on average, 19 out of every 20 ships which sail from this harbor return.
Suppose then that we introduce the notion of the strength of evidence for a
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proposition, and think of it as determined by some sort of function from the
quality of the evidence and the probability of the proposition on the evidence.
Then if levels of confidence ought to be so regulated as to fit gradations of
some feature of evidence, it is much more plausible to suppose the feature is
strength of evidence than either probability on evidence or quality of evidence
by itself.
But even with this significant modification, the principle remains thoroughly implausible. For notice that levels of confidence are to be regulated
by an entirely objective feature of evidence. We are to regulate our level of
confidence in p by reference to what is in fact the strength of one's total
evidence for p. But now suppose that though the strength of evidence for p
is high, I believe, after as careful a reflection as you wish to demand, that it
is weak. I believe that its quality is low, perhaps because I believe it is
unrepresentative, the negative evidence which there is not yet having turned
up; or I believe that the proposition's probability on this evidence is rather
low. Alternatively, suppose that I don't have any beliefs on one or the other
of these matters; I feel totally incapable of appraising the quality of the
evidence or I am baffled by how probable the proposition is on this evidence.
The principle entails that in such situations I am entitled to place a high level
of confidence in the proposition. But surely that is mistaken. If there is
obligation in the region here at all, I should give to p a middling level of
confidence, probably withholding belief. The same holds, mutatis mutandis,
if the evidence is weak but I believe, on careful and responsible reflection,
that it is strong.
The point is that the principle treats our beliefs about the strength of
evidence for some proposition as having nothing to do with our proper level
of confidence in the proposition. That is no more true here than it is in
general. The obligations of medical practitioners are to be determined in the
light of what they believe and should believe about the causes and cures of
diseases, not in the light simply of the objective causes and cures. When in
the course of constructing regulative epistemology one offers a rule for the
regulation of some aspect of our beliefs, that rule will have to give appropriate
standing to our beliefs about the criterial phenomena and not simply to the
criterial phenomena themselves.
However, a subjectivist counterpart to the objectivist rule we have been
considering suggests itself at once: One ought never, for any proposition to
adopt a level of confidence in it which is not proportioned to what on re:o.ponsible reflection one believes to be the strength of one's total evidence for it.
When the limitations on the scope of application which were attached to the
objectivist principle are attached to this subjectivist variant, does it then
specify one of our epistemic obligations?
Assume that quality of evidence is to be determined by reliability. And
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suppose that upon careful reflection one believes that one's total evidence
for some proposition is highly reliable and that the proposition is highly
probable on that evidence. The principle instructs one then to place a high
level of confidence in the proposition. But there is something strange about
this injunction applied to this situation. Could one do otherwise? Could one,
believing that the evidence is highly reliable and believing that the proposition is highly probable on the evidence, nonetheless adopt a low level of
confidence in that proposition? If one did in fact adopt a low level of confidence in it, would that not indicate that one did not really believe that the
proposition was highly probable on the evidence?
I have made no attempt, in the course of my discussion here, to analyze
the phenomenon of levels of confidence. In keeping with that inhibition, I
shall offer no suggestion as to what accounts for the connection here. In
general, of course, adopting a certain level of confidence in a proposition is
not identical with believing that the strength of one's total evidence for it is
of that level-since, for one thing, one might adopt a high level of confidence
in a proposition for which one has no evidence at all. So the connection is
not identity. Any analysis of the phenomenon of levels of confidence should
set as one of its goals to explain and illuminate what the connection is.
But if the subjectivized version, specified above, of Locke's Principle of
Proportionality is unavoidably satisfied, then of course it doesn't specify an
obligation. The truth in the region is at best a descriptive law of some sort.
Correspondingly, if there is indeed error involved when someone places a
high level of confidence in some item of faith held on evidence, the error,
pace Locke, is not to be located in the person's failure properly to regulate
his or her firmness of belief but rather in the person's having mistaken beliefs
about the strength of his or her evidence. The error will lie in the person
having gotten his or her beliefs about the evidence wrong, not in having failed
to get the right match between firmness of belief and strength (or believed
strength) of evidence.

III
But if Locke's position has turned to dust in our hands, does not Calvin's
claim also become at the very least deeply problematic, that Christians are
obligated to trust the promises of God with that high level of confidence that
they are accustomed "to have from things experienced and proved"? If that
were what Calvin held, Yes indeed. But that is not what Calvin held. Admittedly he used words which, by themselves and out of context, suggest that to
us. But he did not hold that. Indeed, so far as I can tell, Calvin did not
propound nor intend to propound any rule whatsoever concerning the level
of confidence that Christians ought to place in the promises of God. He held
that a high level of confidence is desirable, something to be wished and hoped
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for; since, for one thing, such a confidence "renders the conscience calm and
peaceful before God's judgment. Without it the conscience must be harried
by disturbing alarm, and almost tom to pieces; unless perhaps, forgetting God
and self, it for the moment sleeps" [III, ii, 16]. But though firm confidence
is desirable for the sake of peace of mind, Calvin did not hold that it is
obligatory.
Having just said that "he alone is truly a believer who [is] convinced by a
firm conviction that God is a kindly and well-disposed Father toward him ... "
[ibid.], Calvin proceeds to say the following:
Still, someone will say: "Believers experience something far different: In
recognizing the grace of God toward themselves they are not only tried by
disquiet, which often comes upon them, but they are repeatedly shaken by
gravest terrors. For so violent are the temptations that trouble their minds as
not to seem quite compatible with that certainty of faith." Accordingly, we
shall have to solve this difficulty if we wish the above-stated doctrine to
stand. Surely, while we teach that faith ought to be certain and assured, we
cannot imagine any certainty that is not tinged with doubt, or any assurance
that is not assailed by some anxiety. On the other hand, we say that believers
are in perpetual conflict with their own unbelief. Far, indeed, are we from
putting their conscience in any peaceful repose, undisturbed by any tumult
at all. [III, ii, 17]

How does Calvin solve, or try to solve, "this difficulty"? In part by arguing
that the Christian self, here on earth, is a divided self:
In order to understand this, it is necessary to return to that division of flesh
and spirit which we have mentioned elsewhere. It most clearly reveals itself
at this point. Therefore the godly heart feels in itself a division because it is
partly imbued with sweetness from its recognition of the divine goodness,
partly grieves in bitterness from an awareness of its calamity; partly rests
upon the promise of the gospel, partly trembles at the evidence of its own
iniquity; partly rejoices at the expectation of life, partly shudders at death.
This variation arises from imperfection of faith, since in the course of the
present life it never goes so well with us that we are wholly cured of the
disease of unbelief and entirely filled and possessed by faith. Hence arise
those conflicts; when unbelief, which reposes in the remains of the flesh,
rises up to attack the faith that has been inwardly conceived [III, ii, 18].

How can this be, someone asks. How "can fear and faith dwell in the same
mind?" In the same way, says Calvin, that "sluggishness and fear so dwell"
[III, ii, 23]. The phenomenon of the divided self is familiar to all.
It will have been noted that Calvin spoke about imperfect faith. Imperfect
faith is faith which does not fill the whole self, faith which does not squeeze
out doubt and anxiety and fear and "the disease of unbelief." What Calvin
does not say is that imperfect faith is faith of less than maximal firmness.
After all, the difficulty he wanted to solve was how faith can be subject to
doubt while yet being certain.
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Is Calvin's solution, or apparent solution, to the difficulty at all plausible;
or is he engaged in verbal subterfuge? Can one be highly confident of something and yet have some doubts about it-some negative considerations to
which one concedes at least some weight? Similarly, can one, as Calvin
claims, be anxious about what the future holds and yet be sluggish-that is,
not do what promises to avert that which one fears?
I am not persuaded that such states of mind are not possible. But rather
than exploring the matter, I wish to suggest that we still do not have Calvin's
thought fully in hand. Earlier I suggested that the notion of firmness of belief
is ambiguous. By saying of someone that she believes something firmly one
may mean that she believes it with a high level of confidence. But may one
not also mean that she believes it tenaciously, steadfastly, perseveringly?
Perhaps to believe it thus is to believe it and to be reluctant to give it up, to
resist giving it up. It seems to me that these two phenomena are indeed
distinct-that of believing something with a high level of confidence, and
that of believing something tenaciously. One might tenaciously believe something in which one does not have a very high level of confidence; and one
might be not at all tenacious in believing something in which one does have
a high level of confidence.
I do not contend that Calvin himself explicitly made this distinction; in that
regard, he was like most other writers on matters epistemological. I suggest
rather that he operated with the distinction. It is striking how often the language he uses is the language of tenacity rather than that of levels of confidence. I think that the most plausible account of what he was driving at is
that Christians are obligated to hold the faith tenaciously, with steadfastness,
with perseverance. Holding it with high confidence is indeed desirable for
the peace of mind which that brings. But doubts assail us; we can do nothing
about that. What we can do is be tenacious in our holding of the faith. Here
is what Calvin says in one place:
the godly mind, however strange the ways in which it is vexed and troubled,
finally surmounts all difficulties, and never allows itself to be deprived of
assurance of divine mercy. Rather, all the contentions that try and weary it
result in the certainty of this assurance. A proof of this is that while the saints
seem to be very greatly pressed by God's vengeance, yet they lay their compaints before him; and when it seems that they will not at all be heard, they
nonetheless call upon him. What point would there be in crying out to him if
they hoped for no solace from him? Indeed, it would never enter their minds
to call upon him if they did not believe that he had prepared help for them.
Thus the disciples whom Christ rebuked for the smallness of their faith complained that they were perishing, and yet were imploring his help [III, ii, 21].
Clearly it is the tenacity of faith of which Calvin is here speaking. In fact,
he himself speaks of believers as called to persevere in their struggle against
unbelief [III, ii, 17], and as called to steadfastness [III, ii, 22].
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What can and should we do so as to hang on to our faith in God's goodness
amidst the doubts that assail us-to endure, to persevere, to remain steadfast?
It is striking that Calvin does not say that we should put the doubts out of
mind, ignore them. His language suggests that he thinks the doubts cannot
be stifled. What he says instead is that the believer should remind herself of
the promises of God, turning to the Word of God where the promises are
proclaimed. In addition to the phenomena of believing with varying levels of
confidence and believing with varying degrees of tenacity, there is the phenomenon of believing with more or less intensity; i.e., keeping some believed
proposition more or less clearly in mind, closer to the center, focussed-on
more or less intensely. To endure in one's trust in the goodness of God, it
helps to keep God's promises in the foreground of one's consciousness, says
Calvin:
To bear these attacks faith arms and fortifies itself with the Word of the Lord.
And when any sort of temptation assails us-suggesting that God is our
enemy because he is unfavorable toward us-faith, on the other hand, replies
that while he afflicts us he is also merciful because his chastisement arises
out of love rather than wrath. When one is striken by the thought that God
is Avenger of iniquities, faith sets over against this the fact that his pardon
is ready for alI iniquities whenever the sinner betakes himself to the Lord's
mercy. Thus the godly mind, however strange the ways in which it is vexed
and troubled, finaIly surmounts all difficulties, and never allows itself to be
deprived of assurance of divine mercy [III, ii, 21].5

IV

The book of Job is the great biblical book on the topic of the endurance of
faith. The recitation by the writer of Hebrews of the sufferings endured by
the heroes of faith-they "suffered mocking and scourging, and even chains
and imprisonment. They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they were killed
with the sword; they went about in skins of sheep and goats, destitute, afflicted, ill-treated ... wandering over deserts and mountains, and in dens and
caves of the earth." -this recitation invites from the believer the question:
But what do I myself do if, in the face of suffering, my trust in the promises
of God threatens to slip away? It is to this question that the book of Job can
be read as giving (part of) an answer. (Hebrews 12 also gives part of an
answer.) The question to which Calvin addressed himself in the passages I
have cited was closely related, yet different: What do I do when my life is
painful and I begin to wonder whether God is truly well-disposed toward me?
Remind yourself of the promises of God. Yes, but what do I do if, when
having the promises fully in mind, I find trust in them slipping away from
me because of the darkness of my existence?
Introspect, said Job's three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar; uncover
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your sins, and repent. What is happening to you is to be interpreted as God's
punishment.
I refuse to accept that, said Job. Nothing I have done calls for this suffering.
Though God slay me, yet will I defend my ways to his face [Job 13: 15].
It was Elihu who suggested the answer which Job embraced. Though possibly the evidence we have in hand appears, on balance, to be against the
trust-worthiness of God's promises, we have so limited a glimpse of human
destiny as a whole that our total evidence concerning the trustworthiness of
God's promise is not even minimally satisfactory. One's present life may
look dark indeed. But that is not satisfactory evidence against God's having
the will and power to carry out his promise to save one. And further, as to
power: Remember who God is. God is the one who made all this!
Job endured in the faith-with what level of confidence, we are not told.
By doing so, he "pleased God" [Hebrews 11:5].
Of course we in the modern world wonder whether there is any God who
has promised anything. To have doubts about that is to have doubts as to
whether faith, as Job, Hebrews, and Calvin understood it, is even an option.
To such doubts, something different must be said.

v
To tell someone that they ought to persevere in the faith, come what mayis that not to encourage the evil of intolerance in societies where there are
others who do not share the faith? We come at last to Locke's pragmatic
argument for the thesis that Christians ought to hold their faith with distinctly
less than maximal firmness.
In the light of our discussion, let us distinguish, as Locke did not, between
the claim that holding the faith with a high degree of confidence encourages
intolerance, when there are others about who disagree with one; and the claim
that attempting to persevere in the faith encourages intolerance. And let us
distinguish between social and personal intolerance, understanding social
intolerance to consist of the view that others ought to enjoy full civil rights
only if they accept one's own faith, and personal intolerance to consist of
being unwilling to listen attentively to, and take seriously, objections posed
by others (or indeed oneself) to one's faith.
There would seem to be no particular connection between social intolerance
and either holding the faith confidently or perseveringly. There are, after all,
plenty of Christian believers who are confidently and perseveringly convinced of the importance of equal civil rights in a religiously diverse society.
Social tolerance or intolerance has to do with the content of one's beliefs,
not one's mode of holding them.
There would also seem to be no particular connection between personal
intolerance and holding the faith confidently. One can hold mathematical or
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logical propositions with great confidence and yet be quite willing to listen
to those who contend that certain sets of such yield paradoxes. Is there any
reason to think it is different for religious beliefs?
We are left, then, with the claim that a resolution to persevere in one's faith
encourages-or perhaps just is-personal intolerance. Is it not a condition of
authentic dialogue that on the issues discussed both parties have an "open
mind"? Is it not the case that to be "a true believer" is perforce not to take
seriously what is said in objection to one's beliefs? There can be no doubt
whatsoever that the resolution to persevere in one's trust or beliefs does often
yield personal intolerance. Often a fundamental part of a person's strategy
for persevering is refusing to attend to objections.
The question to consider, though, is whether this is necessarily so. Is the
resolution to persevere in the faith inherently incompatible with personal
tolerance, or is it rather certain strategies for persevering which are incompatible? Quite clearly it is the latter. There are ways of carrying out one's
resolve to persevere in one's beliefs and trusts which are fully compatible
with taking objections seriously. Some, indeed, require taking objections
seriously. There are philosophers of all stripes who are examples of thisthough there are also philosophers of all stripes who are examples of not
taking objections seriously. Actually, Calvin gives the impression of believing that believers have no option but to listen to objections, since they do not
just come from without but arise spontaneously in the heart of the believer.
One thing the believer might do is that which Calvin and the writer(s) of
Job recommended: listen to the objections but keep the whole picture in mind
by reminding oneself of God's promises and of God's power, and of the fact
that we have but a glimpse of the full pattern of God's dealings with humanity-to which I would add, reminding oneself of the signs of God's goodness.
Secondly, the persevering believer, rather than merely counterbalancing
objections with considerations drawn from the full picture, or contending that
we do not yet have anything near the full picture, might try to answer the
objections. Instead of accepting them at face-value, as providing negative
evidence, and then looking around for counterbalancing positive evidence,
the believer might seek to show that the objections don't come to much, that
they don't in fact provide much of any negative evidence to be put in the
balance. The believer might either seek to defeat the objections by showing
that their conclusions are mistaken, or seek to undercut the objections by
showing that the arguments offered do not yield the conclusion.
There is yet a third thing which believers can do and have done by way of
taking objections seriously while yet resolved to persevere: They can take
the objections as a stimulus to deeper reflection on the content of the faith.
Sometimes when believers have done this they have come to the conclusion
that the faith as received is compatible with what is true in the objection. At
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other times they have responded by revising the content of the faith as received, so that thus revised it is compatible with what is true in the objection.
"OK. So there are various ways of taking objections seriously while yet
resolving to persevere. But isn't there something wrong with the very resolution? Or strictly, with the motive underlying the resolution? When all is
said and done was there not some truth in Locke's suggestion that believing
with a firmness not proportioned to the strength of the evidence must be due
to some affection other than love of truth? Let it be conceded that Locke's
way of putting his insight was not on target. Yet he was on to something: The
resolution to persevere in the faith-or indeed in some philosophical system
or anything else-has to be motivated by some affection other than love of
truth. Yet when dealing with the question of whether to believe, only love of
truth should enter the picture."
Is the physicalist who is resolved to persevere in his physicalism motivated
by something other than love of truth? Is the Christian believer who is resolved to hand on to the conviction that God has spoken to her motivated by
something other than love of truth? Not necessarily, I would say. But often,
Yes. Is that, though, necessarily wrong?
A whole new topic of inquiry opens up before us. On this occasion we shall
have to be content with glimpsing the vista. We have no time to enter it. 6
Yale University

NOTES
1. To my knowledge, the finest theological articulation in the contemporary world of
this understanding of faith is that by Gerhard Ebeling in The Nature of Faith (London:
Wm. Collins & Co. Ltd., 1961).

2. All quotations from John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion will be from
the translation by Ford Lewis Battles (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub!. Co., 1970).
3. All quotations from John Locke's An Essay concerning the Human Understanding
will be from the text in the edition by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
Here and there, however, I have changed spelling and capitalization.
4. Suppose the principle had been couched in terms of firmness of belief instead of
levels of confidence, and suppose it had been formulated affirmatively rather than negatively, so that it read thus: For any proposition which comes within one's ken, one ought
to believe it with a firmness proportioned to its probability on one's total evidence for it.
(The qualifications attached to the principle formulated in the text should be understood
as attached to this variant as well.) Suppose, then, that the probability of some proposition
p on one's total evidence is .9; the principle instructs one then to believe p very firmly.
Suppose one does that. By the complementational principle for negation (principle of
additivity) in the Pascalian calculus, the probability of not-p is, in the situation envisaged,
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.1. And so, according to this revised principle of proportionality, one ought to believe
not-p very weakly. But of course one will not succeed in doing that; or if through some
gross absent-mindedness one did, one shouldn't. One won't or shouldn't believe not-p
weakly; one won't or shouldn't believe it at all. Thus a principle of proportionality
formulated affirmatively and in terms of degrees of firmness of belief (or of degrees of
certainty, or of degrees of credibility) is patently unacceptable. I'm not sure that Locke
realized this. But in the text above I have, whenever there was a choice, adopted a
charitable interpretation of what Locke had in mind and formulated his principle in terms
of levels of confidence. (George Mavrodes points out the difficulties with the principle
formulated above in his paper, to the best of my knowledge unpublished, MOn Proportioning One's Belief to the Evidence.")
5. Cf. later in the same section: ~Faith, then, as Paul teaches, serves as our shield. When
held up against weapons it so receives their force that it either completely turns them aside
or at least weakens their thrust, so that they cannot penetrate to our vitals. When, therefore,
faith is shaken it is like a strong soldier forced by the violent blow of a spear to move his
foot and to give ground a little. When faith itself is wounded it is as if the soldier's shield
were broken at some point from the thrust of the spear, but not in such a manner as to be
pierced. For the godly mind will always rise up so as to say with David, 'If I walk in the
midst of the shadow of death, I shall fear no evils, for thou art with me.' Surely it is
terrifying to walk in the darkness of death; and believers, whatever their strength may be,
cannot but be frightened by it. But since the thought prevails that they have God beside
them, caring for their safety, fear at once yields to assurance. However great are the
devices, as Augustine says, that the devil throws up against us, while he holds no lodgment
in the heart, where faith dwells, he is cast out. Thus, if we may judge from the outcome,
believers not only emerge safely from every battle, so that, having received fresh strength,
they are shortly after ready to descend again into the arena; but besides, what John says
in his canonical letter is also fulfilled: 'This is the victory that overcomes the world, your
faith. 'M

6. I wish to thank my colleagues at Calvin College for their critique of an early draft of
this paper. I have also been much benefitted in thinking through the issues here by reading
an as-yet unpublished manuscript by Richard Foley titled Working without a Net.

